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2009 NOTE OF THE YEAR
A REDEEMABLE Loss: LYNG, LOWER
COURTS AND AMERICAN INDIAN FREE
EXERCISE ON PUBLIC LANDS*
Rising above Arizona's desert plains, the San Francisco Peaks
reach higher than any other mountain range in the state.' Named in
honor of the medieval Italian Francis of Assisi 2-a man venerated by
the Catholic Church as the patron saint of animals and the
environment-the string of ancient volcanic summits contains
impressive biological diversity and breathtaking natural beauty.4 For
the benefit of generations of Americans, the Peaks are federally
protected as part of the Coconino National Forest.5 Thus, the United
States Forest Service ("Forest Service") oversees the area, which
provides ample opportunity for recreational activities, such as hiking,
skiing, and mountaineering.
In addition to their aesthetic and recreational value to nature
lovers, the Peaks are of central importance to the traditional religious
* The title of this note borrows a short excerpt from a subtitle used by Bryan J. Rose.
Bryan J. Rose, A Judicial Dilemma: Indian Religion, Indian Land, and the Religion Clauses, 7
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 103, 111 (1999).
1 U.S. Forest Service, Welcome to the Volcanic Highlands (Peaks District),
http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/coconino/recreation/peaks/rec..peaks.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2009).
2 See JAMES A. HARDY, FLAGSTAFF VISITOR CENTER, THE HISTORY OF THE SAN
FRANCISCO PEAKS IN FLAGSTAFF 2 (2007). available at http://www.flagstaffarizona.org/
downloads/visitors/peaksistory.pdf.
I See Paschal Robinson, St. Francis of Assisi, THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009),
available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06221a.htm (describing Francis of Assisi's love
of animals and nature).
See generally ROXANE GEORGE ET AL., COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR ARIZONA SNOWBowL FACILITIES IMPROVEMENTS (2004),
available at http://www.savethepeaks.org/images/stories/documents/deis-commnents.pdf
(discussing proposed improvements to skiing operations and their potential impact on the beauty
of the San Francisco Peaks).
5 See U.S. Forest Service, supra note 1 (discussing the protections and restrictions
implemented by the U.S. Forest Service).
6 Id.
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practices of various American Indian groups. Whether they believe
the mountains to be the exact spot of creation, the "mother of
humanity,"8 a theologically necessary sacramental site,9 or even the
home of things divine,o the Hopi, the Navajo, the Hualapai, the
Havasupai, and other tribes have directed religious observances
toward the Peaks from time immemorial."
No small prize, a cynic would find it unsurprising that the San
Francisco Peaks have been the subject of extensive litigation.
Unfortunately, good will between the Indians and the Forest Service
is often not enough to overcome tensions between both parties'
admittedly strong interests in the mountain range. When, in 2005, the
Forest Service authorized the use of reclaimed sewage to augment
snow manufacturing capacity and expand skiing operations in the
Snow Bowl section of the Peaks, Native American groups responded
with litigation in opposition to the plan.12 After an unsuccessful effort
at the district court level, the Indian plaintiffs secured a reversal in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,'3 which granted
relief on the basis of the Indians' claim under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA").14 Unfortunately for the Indian
plaintiffs, their success was short lived. Barely a year later, the Ninth
Circuit reheard the case en banc, and affirmed the district court's
denial of relief.'5
The scenario played out in Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service is
rather common. Practitioners of traditional Indian religions, despite
having strong and identifiable religious interests in public lands, are
staggeringly unsuccessful at vindicating their interests in American
courts. Commonly, Indians who oppose federal land use decisions on
religious grounds seek refuge in the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause and its legislative offshoot: RFRA. Nonetheless, because
federal courts consistently hold that neither source offers anything
more than token protection for Indians confronted with federal actions
carrying catastrophic religious consequences, some suggest courts
7 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
8 Id. at 1100.
9 Id. at 1099.
10 Id.
1t Id. at 1099-1102.
12 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006), rev'd in part,
479 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007).
13 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd en banc, 535
F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).
14 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (2006).
15 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
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have "effectively read American Indians out of RFRA" and placed
them beyond certain First Amendment protections. 16 In light of our
nation's history with respect to groups of indigenous American
ethnicity, that our courts are reluctant to extend expansive free
exercise guaranties to Indian religions is, perhaps, to be expected.
However, it would seem prudent to tread lightly when taking actions
that may effectively exclude entire religions from constitutional
safeguards.
This Note explores possible reasons for the consistent failure of
Native American free exercise challenges to federal land use policy.
Part I provides a synopsis of Supreme Court free exercise
jurisprudence, focusing on landmark cases and statutes that
established the analytic framework for neutral laws of general
applicability which incidentally burden religion. Part I also examines
how Indian free exercise challenges to federal land use have fared at
various stages of the development of free exercise jurisprudence.
Furthermore, Part I discusses the current state of Indian free exercise
rights in federal courts, and the extent to which lower courts faithfully
apply Supreme Court precedent. Part II describes and criticizes two
common explanations of Indian plaintiffs' lack of success: (1) courts
assume a secular-religious distinction in free exercise cases and that
this distinction is incompatible with Indian religion, and (2) courts fail
to appreciate the grave importance of specific sites to Indian religions
because site-specificity is not an essential concept in conventional
Western religious thought. Part III argues that the most pressing
impediment to Indian free exercise challenges is not culture clash, but
a widespread, unduly expansive reading of Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association." Part 111 suggests that the holding
in Lyng was actually quite narrow, and that subsequent cases that rely
on Lyng to deny relief involve factually dissimilar scenarios, which
do not implicate the Lyng analysis.
I. INDIAN SACRED SITES AND FEDERAL LAND
Practitioners of traditional American Indian religions find
themselves in an especially unique relationship with the U.S. Federal
Government. Most Americans who subscribe to religious faiths
embrace traditions with roots in the Middle East and Europe: imports
to this continent.18 The bulk of the remainder finds the closest
16 Id. at 1114 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
1 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
18 See generally GEOGRAPHY OF RELIGION: WHERE GOD LIVEs, WHERE PILGRIMS WALK
(Susan Tyler Hitchcock & John L. Esposito eds., 2006) (describing five major religions, their
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geographic links to its religious heritage in and around modern day
India, and throughout East Asia.19 Thus, religiously significant lands,
for the vast majority of Americans, lie far beyond the purview of U.S.
federal authority. Indigenous to this continent, however, American
Indians trace their religious traditions to sites scattered throughout the
American landscape. As our nation moved westward, the Federal
Government gained ownership over many of the lands inhabited or
venerated by American Indians. 20 Though under federal control,
scores of these lands remain religiously important to various
American Indian peoples who continue to revere them as sacred
sites. 2 ' Nevertheless, federal ownership of sacred sites gives rise to an
obvious tension between Indian religious preferences and federal land
ownership interests.22 Despite the good will that may exist between
23the parties, the Federal Government, as owner, has significant
latitude to use and dispose of Indian sacred sites.24 Consequently,
American Indians often rely on constitutional limits on federal
discretion when they choose to oppose federal land use that they
believe negatively impacts their religious practices. Commonly, the
First Amendment and corresponding religious freedom legislation
frame the arena for such challenges, and, as such, the two provide this
Note's analytical starting point.
Before continuing, it should be said that any general discussion of
"Indian religion" in this Note does not imply that there is a single
religion indigenous to the North American continent, nor is it
intended to minimize the religious diversity among those who trace
their ancestry to pre-Columbian America. It has been suggested,
however, that several theological themes are common among Indian
religious traditions. In fact, identifying such themes and exploring
geographical connections, and the characteristics of their followers).
19 See America.gov, Main Religious Affiliations in the United States, http://www.america.
gov/st/diversity-english/2008/March/20080317160257zjsredna0.8236048.html (last visited Nov.
24,2009).
20 See Gavin Clarkson, Not Because They Are Brown but Because of Ea: Rice v.
Cayetano, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 921, 925 (2001).
21 See Kristin A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting
a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1063 (2005) [hereinafter Sacred
Sites].
22 See id (noting that the Federal Government has the legal power to destroy the sacred
sites on the land).
23 See Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public
Lands, 73 U. CoL. L. REv. 413, 433 (2002) (describing the "trust relationship" between the
Federal Government and Indian Nations that is articulated by the Supreme Court in Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942)).
2 Sacred Sites, supra note 21, at 1063.
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their implications has been the focus of extensive scholarship. 2 5
Nonetheless, whether these characterizations are fair or accurate has
little bearing on the thesis of this Note. In order to debunk
explanations for the lack of Indian success in free exercise land use
cases, this Note may, from time to time, concede such
characterizations if they form an essential premise of a proffered
explanation, but the author seeks to avoid generalization whenever
possible.
A. Free Exercise of Religion: The Established Framework
As commentators aptly suggest, the Supreme Court's record on
free exercise questions regarding neutral laws of general applicability
fails to exemplify perfect uniformity.2 6 The law and interpretations
surrounding the Free Exercise Clause have undergone notable
fluctuation. While the Court, over the first half of the last century,
generally deferred to religious claimants when government actions
restricted religious practice, the Court neglected to devise specific
parameters within which to assess free exercise claims until the early
1960s.27 Once established, the parameters observed by Supreme Court
Justices and the pertinent legislative landscape underwent identifiable
evolutions throughout the latter half of the twentieth century.2 8 These
evolutions continue to reverberate today, and they influence modem
jurisprudential approaches to free exercise challenges of federal land
use policy. A brief abstract of representative Supreme Court cases and
legislative response informs this Note's discussion.
In 1963, the Supreme Court took the first step toward crystallizing
an approach to free exercise and neutral laws that impact religious
practices in Sherbert v. Verner.2 9 In Sherbert, the Court assessed the
constitutional implications of denying government benefits on the
2 See, e.g., JOSEPH EPES BROWN, THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN
(1982); PAUL B. STEINMETZ, PIPE, BIBLE, AND PEYOTE AMONG THE OGLALA LAKOTA (1990).
26 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1252-60 (3d ed. 2006) (tracing the evolution of strict scrutiny review for neutral laws of general
applicability in free exercise cases and its eventual rejection by the Supreme Court in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella,
The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 75-86 (1996) (outlining
the history of balancing free exercise rights); S. Alan Ray, Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association: Government Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause,
16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 504 (1989) (noting the Supreme Court's mixed conclusions on
the correct level of scrutiny); Zellmer, supra note 23, at 479 (noting a shift in Supreme Court
jurisprudence towards a more lenient form of scrutiny regarding laws that are neutral towards
religion).
27 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 1247.
28 Id. at 1247-49 (discussing the drastic changes in free exercise law since the 1960s).
- 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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basis of incompatibility between a citizen's religious practices and the
requirements of the benefit program.30 Granting the plaintiff relief,31
the Court held that "any incidental burden on the free exercise of ...
religion [must] be justified by a 'compelling state interest.... .32In
turn, even in light of such a compelling interest, "it would plainly be
incumbent upon [the state] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of
regulation" would accomplish the same objective "without infringing
First Amendment rights." 33 In other words, the Court employed a
strict scrutiny analysis. Although the decision most obviously
pertained to the relatively unique plaintiff whose religion stood as an
obstacle to participation in a government program, the decision
contains little language that suggests the court meant to limit the
application of strict scrutiny, or any other part of its reasoning, to
such scenarios. 4 In fact, the generality of the Court's wording
suggests it contemplated broad application of Sherbert in subsequent
cases, despite the fact that it proffered no concrete examples of other
types of free exercise violations. 35
In accordance with an expansive reading of Sherbert, and almost a
decade after issuing the decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
strict scrutiny test and began to grapple with free exercise
implications beyond the context of employment benefits. Wisconsin v.
Yoder36 upheld a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision that overturned
the convictions of Amish parents who violated state compulsory
education laws. 37 In accordance with Amish religious values that
30 Id.
31 The plaintiff in Sherbert was a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church who
abstained from work on Saturday because of her religious beliefs. She was denied
"unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation
Act, which provide[d] that a claimant [was] ineligible for benefits if he [had] failed, without
good cause, to accept available suitable work when offered him." Id. at 398 (quoting from the
syllabus).
32 Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
33 Id. at 407.
3 The final section of the Sherbert opinion does contain a discussion of the decision's
scope. Nevertheless, the discussion is primarily concerned with potential Establishment Clause
implications of Sherbert, as well as dispelling suspicions that the Court may mean to impose a
constitutional burden on states to provide unemployment benefit programs. Id. at 409-10. Thus,
language such as "[tihis holding but reaffirms a principle . . . that no State may 'exclude
individual[s] . . . because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public
welfare legislation' is best understood as a distillation of the decision, or an example of its
application, as opposed to a pronouncement of the holding's narrowness. Id. at 410 (quoting
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
3 For example, the Court made the following observation: "For '[i]f the ... effect of a
law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between
religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as
being only indirect."' Id. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
6 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
3 Id. at 234. The Court determined that:
[Vol. 60:1246
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"emphasize[] informal learning-through-doing; a life of 'goodness,'
rather than a life of intellect; . . . and separation from, rather than
integration with, contemporary worldly society," 38 the parents had
held their teenage children out of secondary school because they
believed education beyond eighth grade would remove the children
"from their community . . . during the crucial and formative
adolescent period of life."39 Ultimately acceding to the Amish
position, the Court engaged in a sophisticated inquiry into the nexus
between established Amish lifestyles and the Amish faith. Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Burger observed that "the traditional way
of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but
one of deep religious conviction . . . intimately related to daily
living."40 Thus, to require removal of children from that traditional
community under threat of criminal prosecution would, on its face,
seriously interfere with religious practice by upsetting the Amish
pattern of life: a sort of spirituality unto itself.41
Upon finding that the compulsory education law "unduly
burden[ed] the free exercise of religion,"42 the Court elaborated that
in light of the "successful and self-sufficient" record of Amish
communities, the state had fallen short of its burden to show "with
[sufficient] particularity how its admittedly strong interest in
compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an
exemption to the Amish." 4 3 Grounded in the framework articulated by
Sherbert, Yoder nonetheless stands out from its predecessor. Despite
an apparent lack of familiarity with Amish religious principles, and
for nearly a third of his rather lengthy opinion, Chief Justice Burger
focused on Amish history, Amish culture, and Amish theology in an
effort to understand the implications the compulsory education law
[Iln order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade
against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate
religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of
religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise
Clause.
Id. at 214.
38 Id. at2ll.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 216.
41 At times, Chief Justice Burger's discussion borders on the theological. He even goes so
far as to quote from the Apostle Paul's Letter to the Romans, pointing out that the Amish read
literally Paul's exhortation: "[B]e not conformed to this world." Id. at 216 (quoting Romans
12:2 (King James)).
42 Id. at 220.
43 Id. at 235-36.
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would have on the Amish litigants' subjective religious practice." He
decided that while mainstream American society commonly
distinguishes community relations from religious life in accordance
with prevailing notions of a secular-religious division, the Amish
make no such distinction.4 5 Moreover, the desire to integrate the two
is a key element in Amish religious practice rooted in a particular
interpretation of the New Testament that the Amish believe to be
incontrovertible.4 In other words, upon gaining an appreciation of the
subtleties of the religion at issue, Burger rested his opinion on the
conclusion that unmolested life in an insular, traditional community
is, to the Amish, religious enterprise itself.4 7 He wrote: "In evaluating
[the] claims we must be careful to determine whether the Amish
religious faith and their mode of life are, as they claim, inseparable
and interdependent."" Because he discerned a link between the two,
and because the compulsory education law patently interfered with
the latter, Burger invalidated the law, as applied to Amish parents, on
the basis of Sherbert's strict scrutiny test.49 Such sophisticated
analysis of the interplay between a law and a particular religion is
absolutely unique in Supreme Court free exercise cases. After Yoder,
the Court has refrained from making similar inquiries in free exercise
cases, and usually passes over such concerns altogether.o
Yoder signifies a high-water mark in the history of the Supreme
Court's deference to religious practitioners in more ways than one. In
addition to being the Court's most recent attempt at theological
inquiry, Yoder represents the last time the Supreme Court permitted a
private party to prevail against any level of government on the basis
of Sherbert's strict scrutiny test for neutral laws that indirectly burden
religious practice.51 After Yoder, the Supreme Court's approach to the
Free Exercise Clause underwent a change in emphasis. The Court
"[i]n more recent years . . . [applies] a lenient form of scrutiny to
44 Id. at 209-13, 215-19.
5 Id. at 215-16.
46 Id. at 216.
47 Id. at 216-17.
48 Id. at 215.
49 Id. at 234-35.
5o See infra pp. 249-53 (discussing subsequent Supreme Court free exercises cases).
5' See infra pp. 249-53. The Court's 1993 decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. Hialeah overturned a city ordinance that prohibited ritualized killing of animals, siding
with practitioners of the Santeria religion. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). However, the Court explicitly
rejected strict scrutiny analysis for free exercise challenges to neutral laws. Id. at 531. Instead,
the Court held that, because the law was adopted in response to plans by Santerfa practitioners
to build a religious center, the law was not, in fact, neutral, but rather was a direct prohibition of
religious exercise. Id. at 534-42. On this basis, the Court invalidated the ordinance in light of
the City's failure to establish that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
Id. at 546-47.
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neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden the free
exercise of reli 'on." 52 The inception of this change lies in 1986's
Bowen v. Roy,5  which serves as the modem Court's touchstone in
subsequent free exercise cases. 4
The facts of Bowen present a rather remarkable scenario. After
consulting with a tribal elder, Mr. Roy, a member of the Abenaki
Indian tribe, came to the religious belief "that technology is 'robbing
the spirit of man.'"ss On this basis, he objected to the use of Social
Security numbers as individual identifiers of human beings.56
Believing that such a number would rob her of her spirit and "prevent
her from attaining greater spiritual power," Roy refused to obtain a
Social Security number for his daughter, Little Bird of the Snow.5 7
Subsequently, various social welfare agencies denied Mr. Roy's
family benefits pursuant to a federal law that required families
enrolled in social welfare programs to provide the agencies with
Social Security numbers.58 Ruling in favor of the state, the Court
posited that while precedent established absolute freedom of religious
belief, freedom of individual religious conduct had discernible
limitS.59 Namely, the First Amendment does not "require the
Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will
further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family."a
Applying this standard, the Court ascertained that "Roy may no more
prevail on his religious objection to the Government's use of a Social
52 Zellmer, supra note 23, at 479.
5 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
, See infra pp. 249-51. The continuity of the Court's progress from early free exercise
cases to tests currently employed has been the subject of substantial scholarly interest. See, e.g.,
Eric D. Yordy, Fixing Free Exercise: A Compelling Need to Relieve the Current Burdens, 36
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 191, 192 (2009) (arguing that the development of free exercise doctrine
has created extreme "confusion" throughout federal courts); Nicholas J. Nelson, Note, A Textual
Approach to Harmonizing Sherbert and Smith on Free Exercise Accommodations, 83 NOrRE
DAME L. REv. 801 (2008) (arguing that Supreme Court precedents show continuity). While
some trace threads of commonality back through Supreme Court jurisprudence, a sizeable cadre
of commentators suggests that contemporary judicial free exercise standards are not the true
progeny of Yoder and Sherbert. See, e.g., Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent Methodology for First
Amendment Speech and Religion Clause Cases, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1335 (1995); Nicholas
Nugent, Note, Toward a RFRA that Works, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1027 (2008); Neelum J.
Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801 (2006). Instead,
they argue, modern free exercise approaches are best characterized as innovative and in tension
with prior precedent. See McCoy, supra, at 1335-36; Nugent, supra, at 1027-29, 1054-56;
Wadhwani, supra, at 819. The purpose of this Note, however, is not to rehash previously fought
battles, and it leaves the continuity question unanswered.
5 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 696.
5 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 695.
59 Id. at 699.
60 Id.
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Security number for his daughter than he could on a sincere religious
objection to the size or color of the Government's filing cabinets." 61
Importantly, the Bowen Court distinguished both Sherbert and
Yoder.6 2 Perhaps in doing so, the Court avoided a Yoder-like inquiry
into the unique characteristics of Roy's religious beliefs, as
theological discussion is completely absent from the decision.
Choosing not to apply strict scrutiny in Bowen, the Court wrote: "In
the enforcement of a facially neutral and uniformly applicable
requirement for the administration of welfare programs reaching
many millions of people, the Government is entitled to wide
latitude." 63 "Absent proof of an intent to discriminate," the Court
continued, "the Government meets its burden when it demonstrates
that a challenged requirement for government benefits, neutral and
uniform in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a
legitimate public interest."64
On first pass, one might conclude that Bowen, a
government-benefits case, requires the full Sherbert treatment.
Nonetheless, and despite apparent factual similarities, the Court made
clear that Sherbert is susceptible to qualification, and carved out a
practical exception: if a government entity is confronted with
substantial administrative challenges, courts will subject the
government's internal administrative practices to lenient scrutiny,
even in the face of genuine religious objections.s
Whatever the extent of compulsory strict scrutiny review that
remained after Bowen, the Supreme Court announced in 1990 that
free exercise challenges to neutral laws of general applicability-at
least in the absence of other constitutional concerns-implicated
nothing more than a rational basis test. In the famous Employment
Division v. Smith,66 the Court explicitly jettisoned any requirement
that the State demonstrate a "compelling" purpose in order to justify
neutral laws in the face of the Religion Clause challenges.67 Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia proposed that the diversity of religious
practice within the United States would create an unmanageable
scope of possible exceptions to seemingly benign laws if the Court
were to require that every law challenged under the Free Exercise
61 Id. at 700.
62 Id. at 707-08.
63 Id. at 707.
6 Id. at 707-08.
6 Id. at 707.
6 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488.
67 Id. at 884.
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Clause "protect an interest of the highest order."68 Confronted with
the possibility that such a pronouncement conflicted with the dictates
of Sherbert and Yoder, Scalia explained that past rulings did not stand
for the proposition that religious preference provided a constitutional
excuse "from compliance with an otherwise valid law. . . ."' Instead,
he reasoned, past successful challenges to State action, such as Yoder,
generally involved "not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections,
such as . . . the right of parents . . . to direct the education of their
children."7 o Moreover, Scalia sought to diminish the scope of the
holding in Sherbert by pointing out a string of cases from the 1980s in
which the Court "declined to apply [the] Sherbert analysis." 71 On this
basis he reasoned that any surviving element of Sherbert was
constrained to "the unemployment compensation field."7 2 Leaving
open the possibility "that those seeking religious exemptions from
laws [could] look to the democratic process for protection," Smith
set out standards very deferential to government actors that
foreclosed, for a time, the prospect of substantial relief for anyone but
the most obviously and intentionally injured free exercise plaintiffs.7 4
Perhaps not unexpectedly, Congress reacted unfavorably to the
Court's decision to dispense with strict scrutiny in free exercise cases.
With the express purpose of "[restoring] the compelling interest test
as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder,"75 Congress
passed, and President Clinton signed, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993.76 Most importantly, RFRA provides:
"Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
except" if the government shows "that application of the burden to the
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest"
and "(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
government interest."7 7
6 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 1258 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
888 (1990)).
6 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
70 Id.; see also CHERMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 1258 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 881
(citations omitted).
n1 Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
72 Id. at 884.
73 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 1259.
74 Id.
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006) (citations omitted).
76 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 1263-64.
7 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 1264 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b)).
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Certainly, legislative efforts to counteract specific modes of
constitutional interpretation raise a host of concerns by themselves.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has even held RFRA to be
unconstitutional when applied to state governments, on the basis that
Congress overreached and ran afoul of Fourteenth Amendment
restrictions of its authority. 79 Nevertheless, the Court has yet to
invalidate RFRA as unconstitutional as applied to the federal
government. RFRA's constitutional durability aside, various federal
courts entertain claims against the federal government pursuant to the
RFRA's two-element test, when triggered by a showing of substantial
burden on religion.80 Thus, RFRA remains at least a possible avenue
for challenging neutral federal actions under standards more
deferential to individual religious practitioners than the stringent rules
laid out in Smith.
B. The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The
Unsuccessful Track Record of Indian Plaintiffs
Notwithstanding the ebb and flow of the Supreme Court's
approach, none of the various permutations it employed throughout
the last half century contributed to significant success for Indian free
exercise plaintiffs. While some criticize the internal consistency of
the Supreme Court's progression from Sherbert to contemporary
cases,8 ' constitutional law over the years has been reliable in at least
one respect: regardless of hypothesized emphases de jure or
evolutionary shifts, practitioners of traditional Indian religions have a
dismally unsuccessful record of challenging federal land use policy
78 Chief Justice Marshall's oft-quoted exhortation "[ilt is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law is" serves as the obvious starting point for
criticism. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
7 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not enable Congress to enlarge or to craft previously unrecognized
constitutional rights). However, "[t]hree years [after Boerne], Congress responded once again.
Outraged by the Court's decision in City of Boerne, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [which] prohibits state and local government actions
that impose a substantial burden on religious exercise, unless the government can prove these
actions are the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest." Sara
Brucker, Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service: Defining the Scope ofNative American
Freedom of Religious Exercise on Public Lands, 31 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 273, 280
(2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5 (2006)) (footnote omitted).
8 See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (applying RFRA in a free exercise claim against the federal government, despite the Act's
unconstitutionality as applied to state governments), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
8I See, e.g., Yordy, supra, note 54, at 192 (arguing that the development of free exercise
doctrine has created extreme "confusion" throughout federal courts); see also McCoy, supra
note 54; Nugent, supra note 54; Wadhwani, supra note 54.
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via the Free Exercise Clause.82 While Smith may have expressly
foreclosed relief in such cases-at least before Congress enacted
RFRA-relief had become an unrealistic prospect for American
Indians "[e]ven before Smith was decided," as "federal actions that
impaired [American Indian] sacred sites . . . had been regularly
upheld [by the] lower courts [which] almost uniformly rejected
American Indians' free exercise claims... ."83 Moreover, confronted
with a pre-Smith Native American free exercise challenge to federal
land use, the Supreme Court, itself, opted to part with compelling
purpose requirements.8 This section explores representative failures
of American Indian plaintiffs over the past several decades, the
grounds on which federal courts have denied relief, and the current
state of relevant federal jurisprudence.
Even in the years leading up to Bowen, lower federal courts
routinely disposed of Indian free exercise cases. Sequoyah v.
Tennessee Valley Authority85 is a representative lower court decision.
In Sequoyah, the American Indian plaintiffs, who were members of
the Cherokee Nation, sought "an injunction to prevent completion and
flooding of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River in Monroe
County, Tennessee."8 6 The area to be flooded, considered "sacred
homeland" by many Cherokee, held ancient artifacts of Cherokee
settlement, including "sacred sites, medicine gathering sites, holy
places and cemeteries. . . . The plaintiffs alleged that the
"impoundment created by the dam . . . '[would] disturb the sacred
balance of the land . . .' [and] cause 'irreversible loss to the culture
and history of the plaintiffs."'"8 Affirming the district court below, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the
plaintiffs' concerns for "cultural development" predominated over
any religious interest they may have had in the river valley. 89 Writing
that "[i]t is damage to tribal and family folklore and traditions, more
than particular religious observances, which appears to be at stake,"9
the Sixth Circuit denied relief on the obvious basis that the First
Amendment protects only religious exercise.91 The plaintiffs,
2 See infra pp. 253-61.
83 Zeillmer, supra note 23, at 480.
84 See infra pp. 255-60.
85 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
86 Id. at 1160.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1164.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1165 ("Though cultural history and tradition are vitally important to any group of
people, these are not interests protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.").
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according to the court, had merely established a burden on the
92
preservation of Cherokee cultural history.92
Despite Sequoyah's popularity as an object of scholarly inquiry,93
other federal courts disposed of myriad pre-Smith challenges to
federal land use without finding that the "[Indian] interests [at stake]
were more 'cultural and historic' than religious in nature."94 For
example, Hopi Indian plaintiffs in Wilson v. Block95 sought to prevent
expansion of skiing operations in the San Francisco Peaks on bases
similar to those proffered by plaintiffs in Navajo Nation. Citing
Sequoyah,96 yet staking out a more nuanced analysis, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a free
exercise claimant may only enjoin federal land use policy if he
establishes inter alia the "indispensability" or "centrality" of the area
at issue to some aspect of his religious exercise.97 Because the
controversy centered on a small part of the vast San Francisco Peaks
mountain range, and because the court found that the Indians could
practice their religious ceremonies at locations besides the spot slated
for development, the plaintiffs' claim failed the "indispensability"
test.98 Moreover, the court sought to explain the palpable tension
between its holding and the holding in Sherbert by observing, as the
Supreme Court would later echo in Smith, that Sherbert merely held
"the government may not, by conditioning benefits, penalize [an
individual's] adherence to religious belief."99 Curiously, the court
references Yoder, a case that seemingly extended Sherbert beyond
government benefits scenarios, only as authority for the proposition
that "where governmental action violates the Free Exercise Clause,
the Establishment Clause ordinarily does not bar judicial relief."'0
Other courts eschewed contorted analyses and denied Indian
plaintiffs relief much more directly. Baldoni v. Higginsontl is a
straightforward example. Called upon to decide a challenge to the
9 Id.
9 See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of
Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free
Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REv. 773, 807-08 (1997); Bryan J. Rose, A Judicial Dilenna:
Indian Religion, Indian Land, and the Religion Clauses, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 103, 119
(2000); Zellmer, supra note 23, at 480 n.320.
94 Zellmer, supra note 23, at 480 n.320 (citing Sequoyah, 620 F.2d 1159).
9 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
9 Id. at 742.
9 Id. at 744 (holding "that plaintiffs seeking to restrict government land use in the name
of religious freedom must, at a minimum, demonstrate that the government's proposed land use
would impair a religious practice that could not be performed at any other site").
" Id. (finding that the plaintiffs still had free entry to all but a small portion of the Peaks).
9 Id. at 741.
100ld. at 747.
101 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
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National Park Service's management of the Rainbow Ridge National
Monument and the Glen Canyon Dam Reservoir, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court
that the federal government had a compelling interest in maintaining
and "assuring public access to this natural wonder."1 02 Finding a
compelling government interest, the court did not "reach the question
whether the government action involved infringe[d] plaintiffs' free
exercise of religion." 03
Eventually, however, the Supreme Court issued a decision that
lower courts almost universally adopted as the appropriate framework
in which to resolve all Indian free exercise challenges to federal land
use.'04 The 1988 decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association05 quickly became, and remains, "[t]he leading
Supreme Court case on Native American religion on public lands and
the Free Exercise Clause. . . ."1" Premised on the Court's instinct that
"[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require
the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens,"107 Lyng
jettisoned strict scrutiny and subjected the government policy at issue
in the case to mere rationality review.108
Facing a decision by the U.S. Forest Service to construct a logging
road and commence timber harvesting in the Chimney Rock area of
the Six Rivers National Forest in California, an Indian organization-
along with individual Indians, nature organizations and the State of
California-filed suit seeking to enjoin the government's plan.'" The
area had "historically been used by certain American Indians for
religious rituals that depend upon privacy, silence, and an undisturbed
natural setting."110 The Court conceded, at least for the sake of
"
0 1d. at 178.
03 Id. at 177 n.4.
0 See Dussias, supra note 93, at 831-33 (identifying subsequent cases in which district
courts relied on the holding in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association to
deny relief to Indian free exercise plaintiffs); see also Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535
F.3d 1058, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (finding Lyng to be "on point" with regard to the
Indian plaintiffs' free exercise claim), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009); Kristen A.
Carpenter, Old Ground and New Directions at Sacred Sites on the Western Landscape, 83
DENV. U. L. REV. 981, 989 (2006) [hereinafter New Directions] (observing that Lyng is part of
the "legal framework applicable in many sacred sites disputes").
1- 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
106 Charlton H. Bonham, Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge, and the Uphill Battle Facing
Native American Religion on Public Lands, 20 IAw & INEQ. 157, 164 (2002).
'0 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986)).
18Id. at 450 (rejecting the notion that the government is required to provide a compelling
justification for neutral actions that incidentally affect a group's ability to practice its religion).
10 Id. at 439.
no Id.
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argument, that construction of the logging road and timber harvesting
operations would "'virtually destroy the Indians' ability to practice
their religion."'" Notwithstanding the harsh consequences that the
Court conceded would fall on the plaintiffs, the Court employed a
mode of analysis that was extremely deferential to government
interests. Mindful of the prospect of tension with Sherbert and Yoder,
Justice O'Connor, in her majority opinion, analogized the facts at
issue in Lyng to the facts upon which the Court had decided Bowen,
several years earlier.112 Extending Bowen beyond scenarios that
simply implicated internal administrative procedures of the federal
government, O'Connor observed that the plaintiffs in Lyng presented
a challenge that alleged only damage to "training" and subjective
"religious experience of individuals."1 13 Looking to precedent,
O'Connor asserted that the Court had already "rejected this kind of
challenge in [Bowen]."114 Ultimately adopting the view that "[tihe
crucial word in the constitutional text [of the Free Exercise Clause] . .
. is 'prohibit,"'" 5 O'Connor reiterated Bowen's central conclusion:
the Constitution places no affirmative obligation on the government
to foster the spiritual development and practice of individuals.' 16
Perhaps because the facts of Lyng-members of an insular and
unconventional religious community seek privacy to practice their
faith, free from government intrusion-intuitively feel close to the
situation confronted by the Amish parents in Yoder, Justice O'Connor
was not satisfied to leave all to the tidy reasoning outlined above.
Attempting to distinguish prior precedent favorable to the Indian
interests, O'Connor went on to assert that Lyng leaves Sherbert and
Yoder intact while correctly applying Bowen, by making the
following tortured distinction:
It is true that this Court has repeatedly held that indirect
coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just
outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under the First
Amendment . . . . This does not and cannot imply that
incidental effects of government programs, which may make
it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have
"I Id. at 451-52 (quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688,
693 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Il
21& at 448.
14Id.
"
5 Id. at 451.
116See id. at 452 ("However much we might wish that it were otherwise, government
simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and
desires."); see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their
religious beliefs, require the government to bring forward a
compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.' 17
Assuming this formulation of constitutional law is correct, it
remains of little help to lower courts seeking to sort out the
vanishingly small difference between "indirect coercion or penalties"
and "incidental effects of government programs, which may make it
more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no
tendency to coerce."118 From this language it is unclear if the Court
means that "incidental effects" are simply incapable of coercion or if
the Court means that "incidental effects" that do not coerce implicate
only the most lenient forms of judicial scrutiny.
Most importantly, however, the opinion leaves one to work
forward through its reasoning to understand the basis for the easily
excised and quoted language repeated above. Confronted with the
option of extending one of two active, yet adverse, lines of cases to
the case before it-the Sherbert/Yoder line-of-cases versus the Bowen
line-the Court chose to extend Bowen and its progeny. Once
deciding that Bowen should apply, the "[implication] that incidental
effects of government programs ... which have no tendency to coerce
. . . require the government to bring forward a compelling
justification"ll 9 became untenable. Nevertheless, the reader must page
forward to find the reasoning that supports the Court's choice of
Bowen, instead of SherbertlYoder, as the desirable framework within
which to resolve the instant controversy.
Not surprisingly, the Court attempted to marshal all available
support for its choice of framework, and O'Connor devoted the
remainder of her opinion to an explanation of the Court's decision to
extend Bowen to the instant case.120 The decision to adopt Bowen's
deferential approach and decline to "exten[d] . . . Sherbert and its
progeny," she reasoned, turned on the nature of the relief that the
application of Sherbert/Yoder would sanction. 121 The Indians in the
case had emphasized the centrality of privacy in the Chimney rock
area to their religious practice.122 Despite their stated intention of
merely enjoining the construction of a road, and despite finding that
the Indians "[did] not at present object to the area's being used by
117 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
1 8 See id. at 451.
'
19 Id. at 450.
120 Id. at 452-58.
121 Id. at 452.
122 Id. at 442.
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recreational visitors,"1 2 3 O'Connor deduced that "[n]othing in the
principle for which [the Indians] contend ... would distinguish this
case from another lawsuit in which they (or similarly situated
religious objectors) might seek to exclude all human activity but their
own from sacred areas of the public lands." 24 This, according to the
opinion, amounted to subjecting the federal government to a
"religious servitude," imposed on "what is, after all, its land." 25 In
other words, the opinion reasons that a court should apply the
rationality review of Bowen, and not the strict scrutiny of
SherbertlYoder, when the application of strict scrutiny review would
result in "de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts
of public property" by private individuals. 126 Confronted with the
plaintiffs' claim, which was, in principle, indistinguishable from an
assertion of an absolute right to exclude, the Court extended Bowen
beyond the administrative headaches of social security offices to
avoid the untenable result of extending "Sherbert and its progeny"1 27
to the facts in Lyng.12 8 Once the Court decided that Bowen should
control, the dictates of Bowen required that the Indians in Lyng had to
demonstrate coercion or penalty for their case to be decided via a
compelling purpose test. 129
Although Lyng gives limited practical guidance as to its
application,130 the decision and an expansive understanding of its
12 3 Id. at 452.
124 Id. at 452-53 (emphasis added).
125 Id. at 453.
126 d. Justice O'Connor later writes: "[I]n so diverse a society as ours" the "First
Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public
programs that do not [directly] prohibit the free exercise of religion." Id. at 452.
127 Id.
128 Some commentators characterize the holding in Lyng as "a property law holding [that]
provides that the federal government's rights as an owner trump any interests that the Indians
have in using their sacred sites." Sacred Sites, supra note 21, at 1064; see also Dussias, supra
note 93, at 823 (observing that "[iun the twentieth century, property rights have continued to
play a role in defining Native American free exercise rights" and that "federal courts have
subordinated the free exercise rights of Native American plaintiffs to property rights"); id. at
824 (In Indian free exercise cases "the plaintiffs' lack of a property interest in the land" has been
"determinative"); Marcia Yablon, Note, Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Regulatory
Responses to American Indian Religious Claims on Public Land, 113 YALE L.J. 1623, 1633
(2004) (noting "critics [have] focused on the fact that the Lyng Court's concerns and decision
were based on Anglo-American conceptions of property"). However, it seems that such
criticism overstates its case. Bowen cannot reasonably be construed as a property law holding,
and, according to the Court, the facts in Lyng "cannot be meaningfully distinguished from
[Bowen]." Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449. Thus, it appears more reasonable to understand Lyng as solely
a reading of the Constitution, devoid of bundle-of-sticks metaphors. Id at 452. Moreover,
construing ownership interest as dispositive in the occasional lower court free exercise case does
little to advance the argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Lyng finds its foundation in
the conventions of the common law.
129 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
130See discussion supra pp. 255-58.
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pertinence to sacred site cases animates subsequent federal
jurisprudence.13 1 Havasupai Tribe v. United Statesl 32 is representative
of lower courts' dispositions of sacred site cases in the wake of
Lyng.13 3 Seeking to enjoin the government's plan to engage in
uranium mining in the Kaibab National Forest, the plaintiffs,
members of the Havasupai tribe, filed suit claiming that the plan
violated their right to free exercise of religion. 134 Instead of alleging
interference with sacramental practice-the theory advanced in
Lyng-the Indians in Havasupai asserted that the site chosen for
uranium mining was "the embodiment and center of the Havasupai
Tribe universe."1 35 Thus, as opposed to interference with sacramental
validity via deprivation of needed privacy, the alleged harm in
Havasupai was a veritable act of metaphysical destruction.
Nevertheless, after finding that "[t]he case of Lyng . . . [was]
applicable to the instant case,"'136 the district court held that the
dictates of Lyng prohibited the application of a compelling
justification test. 137 The plaintiffs attempted to distinguish Lyng by
arguing that the destruction of the sacred site was "coerc[ive]."1
However, the court dismissed this argument after finding "no
distinction from Lyng which necessitate[d] a different result."1 3 9
Regardless of the appropriateness of the outcome, at least one thing
about Havasupai is undeniable: the court drew analogy to Lyng
almost entirely on the basis of the extent of the potential damage to
the plaintiffs' religious practice.140 Based upon this conflation, 14 1 the
Havasupai court decided that Lyng stood for the mind-bending
proposition that if the government could show that its contemplated
actions would destroy an entire Native American religion by
obliterating its most sacred site, the government actions needed only
be subjected to the most lenient versions of scrutiny. Consider the
following quotation from Havasupai:
13' See Dussias, supra note 93, at 831-33 (discussing subsequent case law); see also
Zellmer, supra note 23, at 480-81 (discussing Lyng and its effects).
132752 F. Supp. 1471, 1485 (D. Ariz. 1990).
13 3 See discussion infra pp. 260M6.
134 Havasupai, 752 F. Supp. at 1475.
135 Id. at 1485.
136 Id. (citation omnitted).
1
3 7 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
14 1 The decision makes a passing assertion that "plaintiffs [were] not penalized for their
beliefs, nor [were] they prevented from practicing their religion." Id. Yet, this language, taken
from Lyng, is not a prospective situs of analogy within the facts of Lyng. Instead, it articulates a
standard imposed because of certain facts in the case. See discussion supra pp. 257-58.
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Plaintiffs here, as in Lyng, assert that their religious and
cultural belief systems are intimately bound up with the
Canyon Mine site. Plaintiffs assert their belief that [the
proposed uranium mining] operations will destroy their
religion. The Supreme Court, in Lyng, made the same
assumption in reaching its conclusion of no first amendment
violation. Accordingly, the court finds and concludes that no
first amendment violation is present in this case. 142
Despite their early record of tenuous applications of Lyng,14 3 lower
federal courts have eagerly extended their readings of the case beyond
the context of sacred sites on federal lands. For example, in granting
the government's motion for summary judgment, the court in
Miccosukee Tribe v. United States'" held that the government's
failure to alleviate flooding in the ancestral homeland of the
Miccosukee-an area to which the tribe held a perpetual lease from
the state of Florida-posed no constitutional problem in light of
Lyng. 145
Even RFRA has done very little to improve the prospects of Indian
free exercise plaintiffs. One need not look past Navajo Nation for an
example.14 In order to show a right of action under RFRA, a plaintiff
must demonstrate satisfaction of the threshold issue: the contested
government action would or has "substantially burdened" the
plaintiff's religious exercise. 147 Once established, RFRA plaintiffs
prevail unless the government can justify the substantial burden
within the rubric of a compelling purpose and least restrictive means
test. 14 8 Although any framework that mandates strict scrutiny seems
especially deferential to plaintiffs, 14 9 restrictive construction of the
threshold requirement of substantiality sets a high bar for RFRA
claims.
The "substantiality" requirement played the part of a scrupulous
gatekeeper, indeed, in Navajo Nation. Despite conceding the
14 2 Havasupai, 752 F. Supp. at 1485.
143 See, e.g., discussion supra pp. 259-60.
'44980 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Ha. 1997).
s
45 Id. at 464 ("[Tlhe First Amendment does not require the government to assist any group
in the exercise of its religion." (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 451 (1988)).
'46See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(holding that proposed use of recycled wastewater to make artificial snow for a commercial ski
resort in a national park considered sacred by some Indian tribes was not a substantial bunlen to
free exercise of religion by tribal members within the meaning of RFRA), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 2763 (2009).
'
47 See discussion supra pp. 251-52.
s1 See discussion supra pp. 251-52.
149 he adage "strict in theory, fatal in fact" comes to mind.
260 [Vol. 60: 1
2009] A REDEEMABLE LOSS 261
"long-standing religious and cultural significance [of the San
Francisco Peaks to at least thirteen] Indian tribes," 50 and that
spraying "recycled wastewater"',5  on the Peaks (in the form of
artificial snow to be used for skiing operations) was an irreparable
desecration and an obliteration of all sacramental integrity for the
Indians,15 2 the court reasoned that the government's plan did not-in
fact, could not-rise to the level of things "substantially
burdensome." 5 3 Twenty years after the Supreme Court decided the
case, and in the face of an act of Congress which arguably preempted
the decision,'TM the Ninth Circuit reached its conclusion in Navajo
Nation by importing the ghost of Lyng into RFRA's "substantial
burden" element. 5 5  The court's inquiry mirrored the Havasupai
opinion in that Navajo Nation emphasized the extreme harm to the
plaintiffs' religious interests as determinatively analogous to Lyng,
yet neglected to track Lyng's analysis. 156
Beginning from the premise that RFRA's express restoration of
Sherbert and Yoder
lead[s] to the following conclusion: Under RFRA, a
"substantial burden" is imposed only when individuals are
150 Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1064.
151 The dissent points out that not even the Forest Service characterizes "[tihe effluent that
emerges after [several steps of wastewater] treatment . .. [as] pure water." Id. at 1083 (Fletcher,
J., dissenting). Instead, the reclaimed wastewater retains detectable concentrations of "enteric
bacteria, viruses, and protozoa, including Cryptosporidium and Giardia." Id. (quoting a Final
Environment Impact Statement (FEIS), issued by the Forest Service, concerning the proposed
expansion of skiing operations in the Snow Bowl area). Judge Fletcher continued: "[Tlhe treated
sewage effluent must be free of 'detectable fecal coliform organisms' in only 'four of the last
seven daily reclaimed water samples' . . . [and t]he FEIS acknowledges that the treated sewage
effluent also contains 'many unidentified and unregulated residual organic contaminants."' Id.
(quoting ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R18-l1-303(B)(2)(a) (2008)).
I52 1d. at 1064 (majority opinion). It would be nearly impossible to lay out concisely the
precise reasons each Indian plaintiff opposed the use of treated wastewater on the peaks. The
religious theologies of American Indians and American Indian groups is a subject that could
barely receive just treatment in a series of weighty books. By way of a superficial depiction in
the interest of brevity, it appears from Navajo Nation that the main concern among the plaintiffs
was that the introduction of recycled wastewater-not even characterized as "pure" in the
government's estimation--to the Peaks offended a sense of environmental purity which was
crucial to the plaintiffs' religious practice. See id.
153 Id. at 1070 (holding that under Supreme Court precedent, diminishment of "spiritual
fulfillment" is not a "substantial bunlen" on free exercise of religion).
154 RFRA mandates a compelling purpose test in all cases of substantial burden. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1 (2006). Lyng, though postulating a catastrophic impact to the plaintiffs' religious
practice, declined to use the compelling purpose test. See generally Lyng v. Nw. Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
1 Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1071 (asserting that "[tihe Court held the government plan,
which would 'diminish the sacredness' of the land to Indians and 'interfere significantly' with
their ability to practice their religion, did not impose a burden 'heavy enough' to violate the Free
Exercise Clause." (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447-49)).
'Id. at 1069-73.
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forced to choose between following the tenets of their
religion and receiving a governmental benefit (Sherbert) or
coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat
of civil or criminal sanctions (Yoder),15 7
the court quickly disposed of the Indians' claim, because
[t]he use of recycled wastewater on a ski area that covers one
percent of the Peaks does not force the Plaintiffs to choose
between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a
governmental benefit [and] . . . does not coerce the Plaintiffs
to act contrary to their religion under the threat of civil or
criminal sanctions.1
On its own, the premise asserted is exceedingly tenuous. The court
gives no reason to support its assertion, other than contending that
because RFRA references "a body of Supreme Court case law that
defines what constitutes a substantial burden . . . Congress
incorporated into RFRA ['substantial burden' as] a term of art" which
includes only denial of government benefits and civil or criminal
sanctions. 15 9
The claim is implausible. Nowhere does either Sherbert or Yoder
use the term "substantial burden," and neither decision purports to lay
out an exhaustive set of scenarios deemed sufficiently "substantial" to
jeopardize free exercise rights.1 60 More importantly, however, neither
does the Act. Instead, the Act clearly states that it restores a test.161 It
takes an impossibly strained reading of the Act to find that when
Congress articulated a standard by which to judge all future cases, it
really intended to enunciate a comprehensive list of eligible
plaintiffs. 16 2
157 Id. at 1069-70.
58 Id. at 1070.
59 1d. at 1074.
1soSee generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963). Sherbert does make occasional use of the phrase "substantial infringement," and
though the decision held that forcing a choice between government benefits and religious
practice substantially infringed free exercise, nowhere does the use of the phrase suggest a
limitation of the decision's scope to the context of government benefits. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
406-09.
161 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
'
62 Id. The claim that "substantial burden" is used as a "term of art" becomes even more
tenuous when one simply looks at the previous section of the Act. While Congress chose to
encase "neutral" in quotation marks-probably because of its established meaning within
constitutional law-quotation marks surround "substantial burden" nowhere in the Act. Id.
Moreover, if Congress intended "substantial burden" to have a specific definition, it stands to
reason that Congress would have included "substantial burden" in the definition section of the
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2.
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The opinion goes on to argue that because "the dissent cannot
point to a single Supreme Court case where the Court found a
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion outside the
Sherbert/Yoder framework," RFRA's "substantial burden" standard
does not cover government actions beyond the SherbertlYoder
framework. 16 3 However, the court overlooks a fatal flaw in its own
syllogism: the Supreme Court did not use, nor find satisfied, the term
of art "substantial burden" in Sherbert or Yoder.'" Obviously, the
plaintiffs prevailed in both Sherbert and Yoder, but in neither case did
the Supreme Court use the same analytical framework, nor the
specific language, that RFRA statutorily enshrined decades later.165
Most obviously, RFRA adds an additional step not contemplated in
Supreme Court decisions of the sixties and seventies: if a government
action "substantially burdens" a person's religious exercise, then it
may only survive judicial scrutiny if the government satisfies the
compelling purpose test the Court articulated in Sherbert and
Yoder.166 In other words, RFRA includes prior precedents as some of
the latticework within new statutorily created scaffolding, but the
precedents do not form the entire edifice of the Act.167
Perhaps recognizing that an entire decision should not turn on so
tenuous a deduction, the court retreated to familiar territory. Finding
Lyng to be "on point" because the Indian plaintiffs "contended ... the
construction 'would cause serious and irreparable damage to [their]
sacred areas,'l68 the court reasoned that spraying reclaimed
wastewater on the San Francisco Peaks "did not impose a burden
'heavy enough"'1 6 9 to violate free exercise rights under the Lyng
163 Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1075.
164 Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
165 See generally Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
'
6 
"'The purposes of this chapter are-(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth
in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened ...
." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (2006). "Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest." Id. § 2000bb- 1(b). In other words, unless the substantial
burden is justifiable in the Sherbert/Yoder framework, it will not survive under RFRA review.
167 Moreover, an interpretation of RFRA, such as the Ninth Circuit's in Navajo Nation,
renders RFRA a completely ineffective law. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058. Smith does not
purport to overrule Sherbert or Yoder. See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). If all RFRA does is reinstate Sherbert and Yoder, then its passage was superfluous.
Unavoidably, RFRA, under the Ninth Circuit's understanding, is impotently duplicative and
fails to change any part of the judicial landscape.
'1 Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988)).
69Id. Navajo Nation quotes Lyng's "heavy enough" language several times and assumes
the Court in Lyng decided the case the way it did because "the government plan, which would
'diminish the sacredness' of the land to Indians and 'interfere significantly' with their ability to
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standard.17 0 The court went on to emphasize the following memorable
language: "Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the
area . . . those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use
what is, after all, its land."n
Quotations and conclusions tend to wobble, however, when courts
amputate their contextual legs. The quoted statement from Justice
O'Connor's Lyng opinion meant not to affirm a dogmatic principle
that the government has an absolute right to trod heavily over
American Indian interests in public lands, or to suggest that the
government's right makes every resulting burden insubstantial. 172 Nor
is the statement the result of a well-reasoned substantial burden
analysis, as Navajo Nation may characterize it:17 3 the Lyng Court
explicitly stated that the burden on the plaintiffs, whatever it may
have been, was immaterial to the outcome of the case.174 Instead, the
language is a conclusion based on different criteria-the result of the
Supreme Court's application of Bowen's standards to the facts of
Lyng-an application of one precedent among available others.175
Even if Lyng is relevant to RFRA, it follows that the decision only
mandates a similar result in Navajo Nation if on the facts of Navajo
Nation the court can draw sufficient analogy to Lyng. The court must
be able to conclude that "[n]othing in the principle for which" the
plaintiffs in Navajo Nation "contend . .. would distinguish [Navajo
Nation] from another lawsuit [seeking] . . . to exclude all human
activity but [the plaintiffs'] from sacred areas of the public lands." 7 6
practice their religion, did not impose a burden 'heavy enough' to violate [free exercise rights]."
Id. However, careful reading of Lyng makes clear that the Court's decision did not turn on a
failure by the plaintiffs to show that the government's plan was sufficiently burdensome.
Instead, the Court denied relief in Lyng because "[wihatever rights the Indians may have to the
use of the area, ... those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all
its land." Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453. In other words, when a plaintiff seeks to divest the government
of its interest in public land by asserting an individual right to exclude, no burden on the
plaintiffs rights may tip the scales in his favor. See id. at 452-53.
o
70 The argument made in Navajo Nation also makes the assumption that Lyng is directly
applicable to RFRA cases. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1071. The assumption never, in the
majority's opinion, became anything more than just that: an assumption. See id. Nevertheless,
Navajo Nation was wrongly decided, even if the court correctly assumed that Lyng was relevant,
because of the majority's overestimation of the scope of the Supreme Court's holding.
71 Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1072 (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453).
172 See discussion supra pp. 256-59.
17 Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1072.
174 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452 ("One need not look far beyond the present case to see why the
analysis in [Bowen], but not respondents' proposed extension of Sherbert and its progeny, offers
a sound reading of the Constitution.").
175 See discussion supra pp. 256-59.
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452-53. Judge Fletcher emphasized this point in his opinion in the
later overturned Navajo Nation I. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1047
(9th Cit. 2007), rev'd en banc, 535 F.3d 1058 (2008) ("In Lyng, the Court was unable to
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Such analogy, however, fails necessarily in this case because the
Indians sought relatively modest relief. The plaintiffs merely sued to
enjoin the government from sanctioning a plan to spray treated
sewage effluent on their sacred sites. 17 7 They did not seek to exclude
any of the non-Indians currently present in the San Francisco Peaks,
or to prevent the physical expansion of skiing areas.17 8 Nor did they
assert an interest, such as privacy, that had potential to "exclude all
human activity but their own"l 79 from any public lands.180 Instead, the
majority in Navajo Nation was blinded, like other federal courts in the
past,181 by correlating levels of harm in Navajo Nation and in Lyng.182
Discovering this single point of commonality, the court assumed that
it should reach a result similar to the result in Lyng: the obliteration of
an indigenous American religion. This shorthand version of how
federal courts are to vindicate free exercise interests, however, skips a
sophisticated analytical progression that should lie somewhere in
between."
Evidently, not only is Lyng a highly influential decision in the
realm of Indian free exercise and public lands cases, but so influential
distinguish the plaintiffs' claim from one that would have required the wholesale exclusion of
non-Indians from the land in question .. .. By contrast, Appellants in this case do not seek to
prevent use of the Peaks by others. A developed commercial ski area already exists, and
Appellants do not seek to interfere with its current operation. There are many other recreational
uses of the Peaks, with which Appellants also do not seek to interfere. Far from 'seek[ing] to
exclude all human activity but their own from sacred areas of the public lands,' . . . [a]ppellants
in this case are not seeking to exclude any of the extensive human activity that now takes place
on the Peaks." (citation omitted) (first alteration in original)).
177 See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1062-63.
1
7 8 Id.
'
79 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452-53.
1soNavajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058. Admittedly, one could conjure a "parade of horrors"
scenario in which the Indians who venerate the San Francisco Peaks begin with injunctions
against the use of recycled wastewater, but ultimately assert a right to exclude others from
Coconino National Park. However, any fears of such a Trojan horse approach are unfounded
because even this Note's narrow reading of Lyng's scope still prohibits exclusion of anyone
from public lands on the basis of free exercise rights. See discussion supra pp. 255-60.
181 See, e.g., Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990) (holding
that a modified plan for operations of a uranium mine located in a national forest area held
sacred by plaintiff Indian tribe did not violate their right to freely exercise their religion).
182Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1071 (finding that the Court's decision in Lyng was
applicable).
'
83 See discussion supra pp. 256-59. Although not reaching Lyng-like prevalence in Indian
religion and public lands cases, Navajo Nation's has proved convenient support for disposing of
free exercise suits. See, e.g., Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, No. C07-1881RSL, 2008 WL 4962685,
at *5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 2008); Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D,
2008 WL 4426621, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008); see also Snoqualnie Indian Tribe v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that a decision by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to grant a license to run a hydroelectric project for forty
years did not substantially burden the Indian tribes' free exercise of religion).
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is Lyng that it "gives us a legal framework"l8 4 that lower courts utilize
even when doing so is illogical or antithetical to a federal statute.'
Some commentators, however, point to Lyng, not as the seminal case
that initiated a cascade throughout lower courts that "effectively
denies the availability of First Amendment" and RFRA "relief in
many, if not most, cases in which [Indian] religious activities take
place on public lands,"'86 but as evidence tending to show a trend of
tragic irreconcilability between Indian religious interests and the
schema of American civil rights. Instead of characterizing Lyng as a
point of origin, they argue that the decision is a result of a conflict
between underlying dynamics of American legal philosophy and the
unconventional theologies (at least from a Western perspective) of
various Indian religions. The following section explores some of
these critiques.
II. PREVAILING EXPLANATIONS: WHY INDIAN PLAINTIFFS FAIL
A. A Problem of Categories?87
Native American plaintiffs attempting to vindicate their free
exercise rights in federal court must first confront a
fundamental problem. The First Amendment refers to the free
exercise of religion, as if religion were wholly separable from
other aspects of individuals' lives. 88
Even the most basic of comparisons-which assumes the religious
conventions among Indian groups to be indistinguishable-reveals a
stark contrast between Indian theological principles and prevailing
religious mores. Most obviously, "Native Americans' concept of a
supreme deity traditionally has not followed the exclusive
monotheistic pattern of the Christian religion."l8 9 Instead of calling
God a name like Yahweh or Jesus-or even Allah or Vishnu-
American Indians "have used an adjective, not a noun, to refer to their
concept of God, reflecting [a sense of God as] an indefinable
presence." 90 Not until Christians "translated" Indian theological
concepts was the Indian perception of God expressed as the now
18 New Directions, supra note 104, at 989.
185 See discussion supra pp. 259-61.
8 Sacred Sites, supra note 21, at 1063.
'8Dussias, supra note 93, at 806 (This language is a modification of a subheading in
Dussias' article.).
188 Id. at 806 (footnote omitted).
1 Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in
Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 1291, 1296 (1996).
1 Id.
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ubiquitous noun: "Great Spirit."l 9' Perhaps because this
understanding places a premium on presence as opposed to entity,
Indian theology proves a poor implement with which to draw lines of
distinction between the religiously sublime and the secularly vulgar.
In fact, it has been suggested that such distinctions-in many ways
central to Western religious philosophy-are impossible to make on
the basis of Indian metaphysics. 19 2
Nonetheless, further exegesis of such contrast is only of interest to
philosophers and theologians. According to noteworthy weight of
legal scholarship, however, the contrast has had a substantial impact
on the manner in which courts apply the First Amendment and RFRA
in Indian free exercise cases.193 Indian theology's blurred lines
between the secular and religious elements of human experience
explain why Indians regularly fail to vindicate their free exercise
interests in American courts, or so the explanation goes.
As popularly characterized, the most widespread American
perspectives easily "isolat[e] . . . religion from other aspects of
life." 94 One need not go through the trouble of unearthing the
religious inclinations of the drafters of the Bill of Rights to conclude
that not only do such perspectives spill into our cultural lexicon-it is
safe to assume that a wealth of Americans have positive feelings
toward the oft-repeated phraseology: "separation of church and
state"-but that such perspectives may resonate in the minds of our
judges who, as Americans, have been exposed to such points of view.
Moreover, the actual construction of the First Amendment may
require that legal analysis follow a trajectory which, as a foundational
matter, isolates religion and religious exercise from the more
numerous non-religious aspects of citizens' lives. Because the First
Amendment protects not only religious interests, but goes on to lay
out freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, and petition, in a
disjunctive list,195 one could at least reasonably argue that the
amendment's organization makes inescapable the conclusion that
constitutional structure draws a religious-secular distinction.196
Moreover, such a religious-secular distinction has proven to be
quite amenable to conventional American religious customs.197 Yet,
9 See Dussias, supra note 93, at 806.
193 See discussion infra pp. 267-71.
94 Dussias, supra note 93, at 806.
'9 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'96 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 93, at 112.
19See id. (arguing that the "doctrinal structure courts have developed to ensure the
protection of religious freedoms," which presupposes a secular-religious distinction, serves
religions that make such a distinction but does not "ensure the protection of religious freedom
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theologies that treat "law, religion, art and economics . . . as
interdependent parts of an organic, unified whole" may be fatally
foreign to a legal rubric that presumes protectable religious exercise is
distinct from those aspects of life.19 8 Thus, commentators have
suggested that Indian plaintiffs' record of failure is the inevitable
result of a scheme of free exercise jurisprudence that "attempt[s] to
isolate religion from other aspects of life [and thereby] 'forces Indian
concepts into non-Indian categories."" 99 In other words, because
Indian religion places insubstantial emphasis on where religious stops
and secular begins, Indian claims cannot withstand the scrutiny of a
legal inquiry that requires plaintiffs to show, prima facie, the precise
borders bounding their religious worlds. A spiritual practice that does
not constrain itself to neatly defined limits, but embraces all elements
of human life, the explanation concludes, is without category in U.S.
constitutional law.20 Ultimately, a practice the law does not
categorize as religious does not enjoy the protections the law affords
to practices falling within such a category. Because Indian religious
practice tends to be holistic, embracing not only personal experience
of the divine, but also concepts such as community, culture and even
ecology, it is simply too large and cumbersome a thing to
accommodate in a scheme that prefers neat compartmentalization.2 01
This explanation is not without empirical roots. Federal courts
have denied Indians relief on the basis that an alleged religious
... in the context of Indian religion").
198 Dussias, supra note 93, at 806. Dussias goes on to say: "[C]ontemporary Native
Americans seeking to vindicate their free exercise rights may face the initial hurdle of fitting
their beliefs and practices into Anglo-American categories that treat religion as separable from
culture and the sacred as separable from the secular." Id. at 810.
199Id. at 806 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 459
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE
CHIMNEY ROCK SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERs NATIONAL FOREST (1979))).
2001d. at 806-07.
201 Some scholars have even gone so far as to suggest that not only does U.S. constitutional
law prefer neat compartmentalization, but that the secular-religious distinction enshrined in the
Constitution is actually a theological concept, born out of late eighteenth-century American
religious conventions. According to this view, the distinction is the deciding factor in
subsequent Indian free exercise cases. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 93, at 113-16. Establishment
Clause concerns aside, such an explanation rests on an interpretive technique that places a
premium on popular conceptions in force at the time the Bill of Rights was written. Similar
techniques have been strongly criticized. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness:
The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32-33, available at
http://www.tnr.com/booksarts/story.html?idd2f38db8-3c8a-477e-bda-5bd56dee7cO. In any
event, the issue of whether any type of originalism is a mandatory interpretative technique is far
from settled, and there is little to suggest that any federal judge who has ever denied an Indian
plaintiff relief did so based on such an understanding of the Constitution and eighteenth-century
religious practices.
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interest was more akin to cultural practice and historical preference.2
Nevertheless, the explanation is at best incomplete because it
overlooks at least one glaring inconsistency: early in the development
of free exercise doctrine, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,20 3 the Supreme Court
actually sided with religious practitioners who believed their religious
exercise to be "inextricably intertwined with culture and tradition.9204
Apparently, the fact that the Amish made no distinction between
religious and secular, something Chief Justice Burger conceded in the
majority opinion,205 did not prove a fatal flaw in their case. Moreover,
instead of treating the all-encompassing nature of Amish religion as
something that had to be explained away in the face of a hypothesized
categorization problem, the all-encompassing nature of Amish
religion formed the basis of the majority opinion.206 As a threshold
issue, Burger wrote, "we must be careful to determine whether the
Amish religious faith and their mode of life are, as they claim,
inseparable and interdependent." 207 After delving into a very able
discussion of some unique elements of Amish theology, 20 8 the Court
resolved the question in the affirmative, triggering strict scrutiny
review and holding in favor of the Amish parents. 2 09 Accordingly,
Yoder tends to support the proposition that U.S. constitutional law can
actually be favorable to religious practitioners who decline to see
anything secular about the world. Furthermore, the lack of a
distinction between religion and non-religion can serve as a basis
upon which courts vindicate free exercise rights, as opposed to an
insurmountable obstacle.
Not even the years intervening between the Court's decision in
Yoder and more modem times, nor the Court's proclivity to minimize
the scope of Sherbert and its progeny, make the veracity of the
discussed critique any more conceivable. The most credible form of
the argument 210 finds its grounding in the structure of the First
202 See, e.g., Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
203 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
2 0 4 Dussias, supra note 93, at 809.
205 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216 ("[TIhe record in this case abundantly supports the claim
that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but
one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily
living.. .. [TIhe Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines virtually their entire way
of life. . . .").
206 Id. at 215.
20 7 Id.; see also Ray, supra note 26, at 508 (arguing that "Yoder made clear that the Free
Exercise Clause protects not only specific religious practices from unwarranted interference, but
'modes of life' that are 'inseparable' from those practices as well").
208 See discussion supra pp. 246-48.
209 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-35.
210By this I mean to distinguish the type of argument laid out above from the similar
argument that the Bill of Rights is imbued with theological principles. See discussion supra note
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Amendment. It holds that the amendment's disjunctive formulation,
coupled with its listing of religious interests separately from speech,
assembly, etc., mandates a compartmentalized notion of First
Amendment rights.2 1' Even if the approach of the Court has changed
over the years, the text of the First Amendment has not. It follows that
if it truly exists, any hypothesized problem of categories should have
had the same effect on the outcome of Yoder as on the outcome of
Sequoyah. Yet, the holdings in the two cases stand in contrast.
One could reasonably point out that the Amish fall under the broad
umbrella of the Christian tradition, and, as such, American judges are
more familiar with Amish religion, even if it falls as far to the side of
the mainstream as traditional Indian practices. Thus, the Amish need
not overcome the hurdle of "translating" their religious ideology into
concepts more readily understood in American courts.2 12 Yet, such an
observation does little to preserve the explanation. To say that Indian
claims fail because Indians practice a holistic religion that holds every
aspect of life to be religious in nature, as courts conclude from time to
time,213 is to overcome the "translation" impediment. More
importantly, even if one assumes that courts have a perfect
understanding of Indian theology, Indians are no better off in
American courts if the explanation is accurate. Because the problem
is one of a scheme of categories unable to accommodate unwieldy
concepts-not a lack of understanding-a sophisticated appreciation
of just how unwieldy a concept is does not enable a limited system to
accommodate it any better. Thus, if constitutional law could not
accommodate religious exercise which recognizes no difference
between things religious and things secular, then, barring the
possibility that Yoder was wrongly decided-an exceedingly
uncommon suggestion-the Amish would be just as unsuccessful at
vindicating their religious interests in American courts as American
Indians.
B. Site-Specific Exercise
Another popular explanation for Indians' consistent failures to
vindicate their religious interests in federal courts keys in on a unique
aspect of American Indian theology: "Indian religious beliefs, unlike
western religious traditions, are often site-specific in nature and
201.-
211 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 93, at 112.
212 Dussias, supra note 93, at 815-16.
213 d.
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intimately associated with the land and its natural features."2 14
Perhaps more than in any other religion, "[a] close relationship with
[sacred] land[s] 'permeates American Indian life."' 2 15  While
"Westerners link events to the dates on which they occurred[,] Indians
are more concerned with places where the events occurred." 216 For
example, the entire Western calendar centers on the date of Christ's
birth.217 Christian celebrations are held on anniversaries and days
chosen via calculations based on lunar calendars.2 18 Even Westerners'
veneration of secular events tracks dates, instead of locations. For
instance, the minds of most Americans undoubtedly associate national
independence more closely with July 4 than with Philadelphia's
Independence Hall. The French celebrate Bastille Day, not the
Bastille. Indian religious practice, on the other hand, may focus on the
birthplaces of gods, the site of creation, the site of a special historical
event, etc.219 Some commentators go so far as to suggest that Indians
have notions of land and progress that stand in stark and irredeemable
contrast with Western norms.220 While conventional religions
practiced in the U.S. may look to religious sites with varying degrees
of urgency,221 no mainstream American religion's theology so
214 Zellmer, supra note 23, at 432.
2 15 Id. at 431 (quoting Alice M. Dussias, Science, Sovereignty, and the Sacred Text:
Paleontological Resources and Native American Rights, 55 MD. L. REV. 84, 100 (1996) (quoting
PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED Hoop: RECOVERING THE FEMININE IN AMERICAN INDIAN
TRADITIONS 119 (1986))).
216Adam Grieser et al., Reconsidering Religion Policy as Violence: Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 10 SCHOLAR 373, 388 (2008).
217 Give or take a few years. See JOHN P. MEIER, A MARGINAL JEW: RETHINKING THE
HISTORICAL JESUS vol. 1, ch. 11 (1991).
218 Consider Easter: celebrated the first Sunday that follows the 14th day of the paschal
moon. U.S. NAVAL OBSERVATORY, EXPLANATORY SUPPLEMENT TO THE ASTRONOMICAL
ALMANAC 581 (P. Kenneth Seidelmann ed., 1992).
219 See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1099-1103 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (Fletcher, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
220FOr example, Anastasia Winslow argues that while "Christian teachings discuss the
environment as a commodity to be used and controlled ... Native Americans see the world as a
place of gods, spirits, and living beings." Winslow, supra note 189, at 1298. Winslow also
asserts that Indian ideas about land, ecology and industrial progress contradict God's command
in Genesis 1:28: "Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that
moveth upon the earth." Id. at 1297 (quoting Genesis 1:28); see also id. at 1299 ("Concepts of
time may affect peoples' attitudes toward industrialization. People applying linear concepts of
time see process as progress. Thus, progress may be identified with an increase in the number of
... forests cleared .... Linear-oriented populations may see themselves as moving ahead, while
others are moving in circles . . . ." (footnote omitted)).
221 For example, Muslims facing toward Mecca while in prayer, and the Hajj, bear at least
some similarity to the practice of the Indians in Navajo Nation who "communicate[d] with
higher powers through prayers and songs focused on the Peaks." Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d. at
1081-82 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the concept of the Promised Land, given to the
Israelites in their covenant with God, has had substantial effects on Jewish religious history. See
generally Genesis 15:18-21 (New American Standard) (stating God's promise of the Holy Land
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completely reduces to a metaphysical relationship with holy places as
those of various traditional Indian religions.222
This epistemological difference between the Western worldview
and Indian theology, the explanation goes, manifests as a judicial
disconnect. Because the concept is radically foreign to them,
American courts fail to grasp the overriding importance of
site-specificity to Indian religious practice.223 Thus, American courts
are especially inept arbiters when called upon to give qualitative
assessments of the "substantiality" of a "burden" on Indian religious
exercise.224 Stated differently, American courts impose on Indians the
impossible task of expressing in the vocabulary of Western
Civilization-the only vocabulary American courts understand-the
Indian concept of supremely important site-specificity which, as
American missionaries noted, "appear[s] to have," in the Western
vernacular, "no corresponding words." 225
Though such an explanation may hit on notable differences
between the ways Western and Indian civilizations resolve existential
questions, and though courts have, in the past, grossly misconceived
to Abraham). To a lesser extent, Christians have placed devotional emphasis on some of the
places where Jesus of Nazareth is thought to have walked, for example: the Via Dolorosa. Dalya
Alberge, Study Shines Light on the Final Steps of Christ, COURIER, Apr. 10, 2009,
http://www.news.com.aulcouriermaillstory/0,23739,25317546-5013016,00.html. Nonetheless,
Judaism survived numerous periods of exile from the Holy Land and unsuccessful crusades did
not mean the end of Christianity. The destruction of Mecca would not prevent Muslims from
worshipping Allah. However, even courts concede that the defilement of a physical site could
spell the end of traditional Indian religions. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) ("[W]e can assume that the threat to the efficacy of at least
some religious practices is extremely grave."); id. (assuming that "the proposed government
operations would virtually destroy the plaintiff Indians' ability to practice their religion . . . ."
(quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 1986),
rev'd sub nom. Lyng, 485 U.S. 439)).
2 2 2 Cf Grieser et al., supra note 216, at 388 (asserting that Indian "groups become closely
linked with their local environments, and noting that without a link to their surroundings,
Indians lose connections with their histories [and] their [religious] traditions"). One might
observe that members of the Hindu religion emphasize a metaphysical link between life and the
River Ganges in ways similar to how the Navajo Nation Indians emphasized a metaphysical link
between life and the San Francisco Peaks. This may be the case, but several things should be
noted as well: (1) the River Ganges in not located on United States public lands, (2) to the
knowledge of the author, American Hindus have not attempted to vindicate unique free exercise
interests in American courts, and (3) although there appears to be no way to confirm the
suspicion, there are probably exceedingly few, if any, Hindu judges in the United States.
m
3 See id. at 389 ("The Supreme Court's ruling in Lyng ignores these native cultural
concepts of land."); see also Martin W. Ball, "People Speaking Silently to Themselves": An
Examination of Keith Basso's Philosophical Speculations on "Sense of Place" in Apache
Cultures, 26 AM. INDIAN Q. 460 (2002) (informing much of the argument presented in Grieser et
al., supra note 216).22 4 Cf Grieser et al., supra note 216, at 389.
mDussias, supra note 93, at 812 (discussing the inability of Christian missionaries to
adequately translate Native American texts due to the lack of necessary Christian concepts).
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the importance of specific sites to Indian claimants,226 the hypothesis
fails the most obvious of tests. Lyng, "[t]he leading Supreme Court
case on Native American religion on public lands and the Free
Exercise Clause," 227 recognized that construction of a logging road
through the Chimney Rock site may have "'virtually destroy[ed] the
. . . Indians' ability to practice their religion." 22 8 Nonetheless, the
Court held that "the Constitution simply [did] not provide a principle
that could justify upholding [the Indians'] legal claims." 22 9 In other
words, Lyng gave the importance of specific location a most generous
benefit of the doubt: something the proffered explanation
characterizes as impossible. Despite doing what the critique
hypothesizes to be impossible and accepting the catastrophic effect of
the logging road on religious practices, the Court still rejected the
Indians' claim. The record of the lower courts reveals the explanation
to be even more tenuous. After Lyng, conceding the obliteration of
entire Indian religions became a refrain among the lower courts in
free exercise cases decided in favor of the government.230 Evidently,
failure of courts to appreciate the impending destruction of Indian
religions via desecration of sacred sites is not the only thing that
produces outcomes favorable to the state.
If1. THE PROBLEMS OF LIMITED COMPARISONS: DRAWING FALSE
ANALOGIES TO LYNG
A. "Pluritas non est ponenda sine necessitate"231
Little about the discussed critiques, beyond the occasional bit of
commendable theological dexterity, proves especially helpful. Each
explanation falls apart under light scrutiny, and, even if true, each
explanation affirms the proposition that Indian religion is
irreconcilable with the scheme or administration of American civil
rights-not a terribly heartening state of affairs for Indians or their
allies. If Indians' losing record in federal courts results from
226 See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that because
the Indian plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their religious ceremonies could not be physically
practiced elsewhere, the plaintiffs failed to establish a free exercise violation).
2 27 Bonham, supra note 106, at 164.
2 28 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 458 U.S. 439, 451-52 (1988)
(alteration in original) (quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d
688, 693 (9th Cir. 1986)). Put differently, "the logging and road-building projects at issue in
[Lyng] could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices." Id.229 Id. at 452.230 See discussion supra pp. 260-66.
231 "Plurality should not be posited without necessity." Encyclopadia Britannica Online,
Ockham's razor, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/424706/Ockhams-razor (last
visited Sept. 23, 2009).
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something less systemic, however, a possibility remains that Indians
may yet vindicate free exercise rights in American courts.
Survey of Indian free exercise on public lands cases calls for
conclusions markedly less fatalistic than those advanced in the
theologically based critiques discussed supra. While the Indian free
exercise line of jurisprudence shows itself to be especially invariable,
the obvious commonality among decisions has little to do with
irredeemable culture clash. Instead, Indian claims tend to fail on the
basis of the following commonly recited refrain: "Lyng is on point,
and Lyng countenances would cause serious and irreparable damage
to Indian religious practice." As things stand, lower courts-except in
some ultimately overruled decisions-have yet to find a case
involving Indians and public lands in which they do not judge Lyng to
be resoundingly analogous.2 32 Such analogies are usually, and
tenuously, drawn from three similarities between Lyng and the case at
bar: (1) the case involves Indians asserting free exercise rights, (2) the
case involves public lands, and (3) the challenged government action
would have a devastating impact on the Indian plaintiffs' religious
experience. The practice of lower courts, then, is to satisfy this
checklist, assert that once the checklist is satisfied Lyng prohibits
strict scrutiny review (or, in RFRA cases, that Lyng prohibits finding
any sort of burden on religious practice), and dismiss a plaintiffs
claim.
Regardless of whether Lyng is rightly or wrongly decided, Lyng
functions on a level unappreciated by lower courts. As opposed to a
factually sensitive analysis that clearly delineated when, how and to
what degree government actions might burden religious interests in
232 See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc);
see also South Fork Band v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, No. 3:08-CV-00616-LRH-RAM, 2009 WL
249711, at *13 (D. Nev. Feb. 3, 2009) (denying the Indian plaintiffs' claim that the
government's digging of a 2,000-foot-deep pit on their religious sites violated the RFRA);
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 980 F. Supp. 448, 465 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(holding that the federal government did not need to provide compelling justification for its
failure to alleviate flooding on Indian religious sites and, subsequently, did not infringe upon the
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights); Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471,
1485-86 (D. Ariz. 1990) (denying the plaintiffs' claim that uranium mining near one of their
most sacred sites would violate their free exercise rights); Attakai v. United States, 746 F. Supp.
1395, 1403-04 (D. Ariz. 1990) (dismissing the Indian plaintiffs' claim that the federal
government's construction of fences and livestock watering facilities on their religious sites
violated the First Amendment). However, federal courts more readily distinguish Lyng in land
and free exercise cases not involving Indians. See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of
Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 168-169 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that Lyng was distinguishable from the
plaintiffs' claim and enjoining the defendants from removing eruv markers on utility poles,
which were used by the Jewish plaintiffs on the Sabbath); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress
Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d. 1203, 1227 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (enjoining the
defendants from turning the Christian plaintiffs' property into commercial retail space and
noting that, unlike Lyng, the defendants did not own the property in question).
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the scheme of American law, Lyng turns on a single fact: the plaintiffs
had asserted a right that would have enabled them "to exclude all
human activity but their own from sacred areas of the public
lands."23 3 Because a state of affairs in which private citizens could
assert "de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of
public property" 234 was, as the Court quite reasonably concluded,
untenable, the Court utilized a form of scrutiny favorable to the
government.235 The shorthand version of the Lyng analysis invented
by lower courts, however, glosses over this crucial element of the
decision, and devolves into an exercise in matching-up practical
results of cases. The Lyng Court employed an approach deferential to
the government (even in the face of catastrophic religious harm) not
because the case involved Indian plaintiffs or public lands, and
certainly not because the proposed government action risked
irreversible religious harm, but instead because the plaintiffs had
asserted a right to exclude all human activity but their own from the
government's land.2 36 It follows that courts may draw an accurate
analogy to Lyng only when plaintiffs assert, based on free exercise
interests, rights to exclude others from public lands. 2 37  Stated
differently, the harshness of Lyng is constitutionally required only
when plaintiffs seek to usurp the benefits of public ownership, and
Lyng offers little instruction on weighing the substantiality of
burdens.2 38 Thus, Indian free exercise plaintiffs fail consistently for
233 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.439, 452-53 (1988).
234 Id. at 453.
235 Id.
236 See discussion supra pp. 256-60.
237 Employment Division v. Smith does make several references to Lyng. See, e.g., 494 U.S.
872, 885 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488 (citing Lyng 485 U.S. at 451). The language from Lyng cited to,
and partially quoted, in Smith ("Whatever may be the exact line between unconstitutional
prohibitions on the free exercise of religion and the legitimate conduct by government of its own
affairs, the location of the line cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action
on a religious objector's spiritual development.") is conclusory-based on a consideration of
plaintiffs' assertion of rights to exclude others from public lands in the scheme of constitutional
law-not prescriptive. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451); see also
discussion supra pp. 256-60. In other words, while Lyng supports the Court's observation in
Smith that it had not always applied strict scnutiny in free exercise cases, the support stops there.
Moreover, even if Smith were to lend some credibility to the lower courts' reading of Lyng in
First Amendment cases, importing Lyng into RFRA cases via Smith-which RFRA explicitly
preempts-seems especially perverse. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the continuity
between Lyng and Smith is not beyond dispute. Justice O'Connor, who authored the majority
opinion in Lyng, chose to write a concurring opinion in Smith rather than join the majority.
Smith, 494 U.S., at 881-907 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor argued the majority
misinterpreted "settled First Amendment precedent." Id. at 903. In addition, at least a majority
of Congress and one sitting president seem to have found the case to be wrongly decided when
they passed and signed RFRA in 1993. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (2006)).
238 See discussion supra pp. 255-59.
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one very simple reason: lower courts misread the majority opinion in
Lyng. Logically, however, Lyng is analogous to only a small subset of
Indian free exercise cases. It is not dispositive of all.
Accordingly, popular critiques of Indian free exercise
jurisprudence prove to be imprecise. A more principled investigation
uncovers the wide scope of Lyng's application in the lower courts as
the pressing impediment to Indian plaintiffs, and seeks to understand
why lower courts so consistently misapply the decision.
B. Circumscribed: The Lower Courts' Perspective
Buddhists tell a story about some blind men and an elephant.239
Asked to describe the elephant, each man walks up to the creature,
feels the contours of a different part of its body, and gives, in
description, what seems to his mind a well-reasoned simile.m The
man who touches the elephant's head says that the elephant is like a
water-pot, the man who grabs the tip of its tusk: like a peg.24 1 The
story needs no religious context to convey a clear meaning: when
confronted with novelty, human beings are apt to focus on similarities
of the lowest order between the known and the unknown; between the
comfortable and the awkward. Relieved to happen upon an
easily-understood point of reference, human inquiry stops abruptly.
It would seem that federal courts are not immune from such
limitations, and subject matter novel to the minds of federal judges
tends to captivate their applications of Supreme Court precedent. The
U.S. Census Bureau characterizes barely more than 1.5% of the
population of the United States as American Indian/Alaska Native.24 2
A sizable number of those so characterized live in decidedly
American Indian enclaves, 243 where the cultures are presumably
isolated, to some extent, from broader American society. Even if one
assumes that half of the people characterized as American
Indian/Alaska Native by the U.S. Census Bureau practice distinctly
traditional American Indian religions, 244 American Muslims would
2 9 See DHAMMAPALA, THE UDANDA COMMENTARY 878-80 (Peter Masefield trans., The
Pali Text Society 2d vol. 1995).24 Id.241 Id.
242 STELLA U. OGUNWOLE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WE THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN INDIANS
AND ALASKAN NATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2006), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2006pubs/censr-28.pdf.
2 43 Id. at 14.
2
" Because of the variance of spiritual practice among American Indians, an accurate
estimate of the number of Indians who adhere to traditional Indian religions strikes the author as
impossible to make. Nonetheless, some have tried. See, e.g., BARRY A. KOSMIN Er AL.,
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 10 (2001) ("Native Americans ... [have] a
religious profile very similar to white, non-Hispanic Americans: 20% self-identified as Baptist,
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outstrip observant Indians by more than two-to-one. 245 The number of
American Buddhists might exceed the number of traditionally
religious Indians by more than one million.24 In addition to these
statistics, Native Americans appear to be underrepresented on the
federal bench, to say the least.2 47 So, the subject of Native American
religion, as a product of sheer demographics, is an unfamiliar one to
judges and, probably, to most of the country.
Most importantly, however, Indians seeking to vindicate a right to
exercise freely a traditional religion carry with them into federal court
something at least as unique as it is unfamiliar: spirituality
extraordinarily different from the religions practiced by nearly all
American pluralities, the rough edges of which have yet to be filed
down by millennia of Western Civilization and focused in the vision
of the law.248 Confronted with such a foreign element at the heart of a
free exercise case-the simplest of which require judges to navigate a
maddening maze of Supreme Court jurisprudence, fraught with
internal tension and the occasional legislative mandate fired across
the Court's bow24 9-federal judges are in a position not unlike that of
the blind men in the Buddhist fable: uncomfortably unsure of what,
exactly, an elephant is like or its place among things slightly more
familiar. Resting one hand on the top of the elephant's head, and with
the other, tipping over a water-pot called Lyng v. Northest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association, courts make the first obvious
conclusion: similarity (both involve Indians, free exercise and public
lands). Confronted with two alternatives, one difficult and one
convenient, courts decline probing the similarity in greater depth; lest
the Pandora's box of free exercise jurisprudence spring open
unexpectedly, lest a searching embrace of the animal's head prompt it
to stampede. Instead of chancing an outcome that might not fit within
the virtually unknowable landscape of free exercise-a very real
17% as Catholic and 17% indicated no religious preference. Only 3% indicated their primary
religious identification as an 'Indian' or tribal religion.").
245 See Council on American-Islamic Relations, About Islam and American Muslims,
http://sun.cair.com/AboutIslam/IslamBasics.aspx (last visited November 20, 2009) (estimating
that there are 7 million Muslims living in the United States). Compare this figure with the
Census Bureau's estimate of 4.5 million American Indians in the United States. OGUNWOLE,
supra note 242, at 2.
246See The Pluralism Project at Harvard University, Statistics, http://pluralism.org/
resources/statistics/index.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
7 The first Native American judge, Frank Howell Seay, was not appointed until 1970. See
Judges of the United States Courts, Milestones of Judicial Service, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/
tGetInfo?jid=2137 (last accessed Sept. 23, 2009).
248 See discussion supra pp. 266-73.
24 9 See discussion supra pp. 245-52.
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possibility considering the improbability of discerning much of help
in established precedent and legislative policy2 50 -courts grasp at
straws to show that the Supreme Court, in fact, already decided the
difficult case at bar, preordaining a result in the instant case. Thus,
lower courts apply Lyng in even the most unfounded of scenarios
because it seems to offer the prospect of factual analogy in an area of
the law that consists almost exclusively of convoluted theory, and
requires an analysis that lies uncomfortably close to speculation.
Because the prevalent misapplication of Lyng effectively disposes of
hard cases, recognizing dissimilarity between Lyng and those hard
cases proves exceedingly inconvenient. Because Supreme Court
jurisprudence on Indian free exercise contains only one point of
comparison, courts easily make the oversight that sends them down
the more convenient path.
The utility of a widespread misapplication of the law does not
justify the misapplication, even if guidance from higher courts is
especially scant or unhelpful. Widespread misapplication of the law,
however, does justify more guidance from higher courts. If the
Supreme Court were to take on an Indian free exercise and public
lands case and distinguish Lyng, the misconception that Lyng is a sort
of catch-all that "effectively denies the availability of First
Amendment" and RFRA "relief in many, if not most, cases in which
[Indian] religious activities take place on public lands" 251 would be
blown completely off its hinges. Because the existence of merely one
Supreme Court precedent rooted in facts similar to Indian free
exercise and public lands cases prompts lower courts' common
misarticulation of the law, a broader and more varied base of
precedents, rooted in facts of Indian free exercise and public lands
cases, would do much to alleviate the all-or-nothing (perhaps more
accurately stated as a nothing-or-nothing) misconception.25 2
In the end, at least one important conclusion becomes clear:
fatalism over the prospects of protecting Indian free exercise within
the framework of U.S. Constitutional law is unfounded. The source of
Indians' consistent losing records is not an inability on the part of the
Constitution or the courts to accommodate Indians' unique brand of
religious exercise. Instead, the source is a commonly made legal
25 See Yordy, supra note 54 (arguing that the development of the free exercise doctrine
has created extreme "confusion" throughout federal courts).
25 Sacred Sites, supra note 21, at 1063.
2 The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari to the Indians' appeal of Navajo Nation is an
obvious lost opportunity. 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009). Nonetheless, there is little about Navajo
Nations that makes it stand apart from cases that deny relief on the basis of faulty analogies to
Lyng. Taking on a future Indian free exercise case and issuing a decision that tracks Lyng's
subtleties would be just as useful.
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error: misarticulating Lyng and applying the decision beyond the
stretches of feasible analogy. So common is the error that lower
courts conflate its prevalence with great strength of precedent, while
abrogating the holding of the underlying case.
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